England’s opening World Cup match, a 4-2 victory over Croatia, offered a striking glimpse into how dramatically the national team has changed under Thomas Tuchel.
For many years, Gareth Southgate shaped England into a side capable of deep tournament runs, reaching the European Championship final in both 2021 and 2024.
But while results ultimately define a manager’s legacy, the style and philosophy behind those results matters deeply to supporters and analysts alike.
The most immediate shift under Tuchel has been his willingness to leave established star names out of the squad entirely, regardless of their reputations.
At Euro 2024, Southgate fielded Phil Foden on the left wing, Cole Palmer in attacking midfield and Trent Alexander-Arnold in a holding midfield role.
Tuchel left all three out of his World Cup squad, a bold signal of his system-first philosophy over any player-first sentiment.
Morgan Rogers, considered a better fit for the number ten role in Tuchel’s preferred setup, was selected ahead of both Foden and Palmer.
Southgate’s approach involved identifying the best available individuals first, then constructing a system around them, a method critics argued led to players being shoehorned into unsuitable positions.
Tuchel, by contrast, defined his tactical system before selecting the players he felt could best execute the specific roles required within it.
Assistant coach Anthony Barry articulated the thinking clearly, telling the Guardian: “There are emotional wins you can get as a coach in the first and final thirds – playing out from the back, pressing from the front. But in the middle area of the pitch, those 24 metres, we feel the game has become stuck, particularly in the Premier League.”
Barry continued: “Everybody has so much information now. They know how to set up – mid-blocks, deep blocks. We are really trying to focus on accelerating the game across those 24 metres.”
That philosophy was plain to see against Croatia, with goalkeeper Jordan Pickford registering 72 touches as England repeatedly played backwards to invite pressure before releasing runners in behind.
Southgate’s sides traditionally favoured a slower, more controlled build-up, moving up the pitch as a unit before attempting to break down opposition low blocks.
That approach worked well against teams content to sit deep, but later in his tenure England increasingly faced more organised mid-blocks and higher-pressing opponents who exposed its limitations.
Tuchel’s answer to these defensive challenges is rooted in pre-planned patterns and automatic movements, rather than relying on individual players to improvise solutions in the moment.
Against Croatia, Declan Rice moved to a wide-left position as England played backwards, freeing space centrally for Harry Kane to drop into alongside Elliot Anderson, with Jude Bellingham pushing forward into the last line.
These rehearsed movements effectively undid Croatia’s press, with the sequences finishing with Kane or Anderson playing the ball long into Bellingham, Anthony Gordon or Noni Madueke.
Southgate’s England, by comparison, leaned on players such as Alexander-Arnold and Kobbie Mainoo to find their own passing solutions against defensive blocks, an intuitive method that was harder for opponents to prepare for but left England vulnerable against well-organised defences.
Bellingham did score an individually brilliant goal against Croatia, though it arrived within a well-rehearsed attacking routine that Tuchel has developed throughout his reign.
Southgate was pragmatic to his core, reducing variance and keeping matches tight rather than allowing them to open up, which ultimately brought England to within touching distance of major honours.
Tuchel carries a greater appetite for risk, and England’s substitutions against Croatia were like-for-like in profile rather than designed to change the team’s shape or balance.
The side looked more defensively exposed than Southgate’s teams, but for many England supporters that is a trade-off they are more than willing to accept.
